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Abstract: The paper analyses three underexplored issues in the entrepreneurship capital spillover literature, 
namely, its local nature, the generators and the receptors of such spillovers. For that purpose, we take 
advantage of the Ecuadorian census of establishments. Unlike previous evidence, we can estimate the 
spillovers at the establishment level, compute the entrepreneurship capital at the local level, and compare 
different permissiveness levels in the application of registration and tax legislation to businesses (i.e., the 
relative importance of the informal economy). In general, we find entrepreneurship capital spillovers at the 
local level. The spillover effects are lower when the entrepreneurship capital has been accumulated in 
informal businesses. By contrast, informal, large and more technologically developed establishments 
benefit more from these spillover effects. The paper discusses the implications of those findings for the 
design of public policies for promoting entrepreneurship. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
Public policies that promote entrepreneurship have been justified by its positive spillovers on the 
productivity of the other firms in the region (Acs et al. 2016). Although there is extensive evidence 
of entrepreneurship capital spillovers1, much less evidence is available on how the spillovers are 
produced, and therefore there is a lack of insights about how the public policies have to be 
developed (Acs et al. 2008). Theoretical arguments justifying the existence of entrepreneurship 
capital spillovers, like the Knowledge Spillover Theory of Entrepreneurship, KSTE (Audretsch 
and Keilbach 2005; 2007; Acs et al. 2009; Audretsch and Lehmann 2017), do not specify its 
geographical extension nor exclude its heterogeneity among firms and industries. We use a unique 
database containing information for the 445,490 establishments in Ecuador in the year 2010 in 
order to analyse the presence of entrepreneurship capital spillovers at the local level and explore 
whether are differences in the generation and reception of such spillovers between different types 
of firms. Those questions and evidence are crucial for policy makers and are appealing for 
theoretical debate.  
 
At the time the data were collected, Ecuador was administratively organized in 24 provinces, 
among which 224 cantons were distributed (see Table 1 and Graph 1 for more detailed 
information). The governments of the country, provinces and cantons were all elected by their 
inhabitants. The presence of entrepreneurship capital spillovers at the level of Eurostat2 NUTS-3 
regions or are even more aggregated (NUTS2) is well documented. However, as far we know, 
there is no evidence of such spillovers at the local level (formerly NUTS-5 or new LAU2). We 
provide evidence that establishments in cantons with more entrepreneurship capital than the other 
cantons of the same province are on average more productive. This evidence seems quite relevant 
for the justification of the local development of public policies for promoting entrepreneurship 
beyond those developed at superior administrative levels, in the case of Ecuador provincial or 
country governments.   
 
This study analyses the spillover effects of local entrepreneurship capital in a Latin American 
country. A distinctive feature of Latin American countries from European or North American 
                                                 
1 Audretsch and Keilbach (2004a,b,c, 2005; 2008); Mueller (2006, 2007); Böente et al. (2008); Cravo et al. (2010); 
Stough et al. (2008); Chang (2011); Hafer (2013); Laborda et al. (2011); Mendonça and Grimpe (2015); Massón-
Guerra and Ortín-Ángel (2017a). 
2 For further information, see [http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/nuts/history]. 
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ones (the previously most analysed countries) is the weight of the informal economy, those 
economic activities partially or fully outside of government regulation and taxation. Based on our 
data, the informal economy represented 34.96% of the establishments in 2010. These figures are 
similar to estimates for other Latin American countries from previous studies (Scneider and Enste 
2000 or Laporta and Shleifer 2008). From a theoretical perspective, it has been suggested that the 
level of the informal economy is in part a consequence of political decisions (Acs et al. 2008). 
Therefore, in order to develop public policies, it is important to know the role and weight of the 
informal economy in entrepreneurship capital spillovers. Public policies for promoting specific 
types of entrepreneurs are justified when those entrepreneurs have been identified among the main 
generators of spillovers. Although some efforts have been made to identify those generators of 
spillovers (Audretsch and Keilbach, 2004a, b, c, 2008), those efforts are mostly focused on the 
technological capabilities of the entrepreneurs.  
 
The data is taken from the census of establishments in Ecuador. Data at the establishment level 
let us analyse the main receptors of spillovers. Those analyses open challenges in the way that 
public policies have to be supported. Public policies are expensive. Therefore, it can be argued 
that it is fair that those establishments or firms that benefit the most from entrepreneurship capital 
spillovers provide a higher financial support to those policies. The paper provides the first steps 
in the identification of entrepreneurship capital receptors. This research line is academically 
appealing as a way to develop theoretical arguments for explaining these differences. This paper 
provides a tentative explanation that combines the arguments from the KSTE and the absorptive 
capacity theory (Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Qian and Acs 2013). Information at the establishment 
level has been unusual in the previous literature. Massón-Guerra and Ortín-Ángel (2017b) argued 
that data at the regional level does not allow researchers to clearly distinguish when the 
relationship between regional GDP and entrepreneurship capital is due to spillovers or 
technologies with decreasing returns to scale. Therefore, data at the establishment level provides 
a better estimation of the entrepreneurship capital spillover than data aggregated at the regional 
level. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the related literature and state the 
hypotheses. Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 presents the production functions estimated at 
the establishment level. Section 5 discusses the implications and concludes the paper.  
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2. Related literature 
 
There is a stream of literature (Audretsch and Keilbach 2004a, b, c, 2005, 2008; Mueller 2006, 
2007) that estimates the impacts of regional entrepreneurship capital on the production of a given 
region. In those studies, the regions vary from countries (Cravo et al. 2010; Stough et al. 2008; 
Chang 2011; Hafer 2013; Laborda et al. 2011; Mendonça and Grimpe 2015) to regions equivalent 
to a NUTS-3 level according to the Eurostat classification (Salas-Fumás and Sánchez-Asín 2008, 
2010, 2013a,b). As far we know, there are no studies based on the local level, equivalent to 
cantons, with data aggregated at the establishment level.  
 
We adapt the methodology that is usually employed in the cited literature to the available data. In 
fact, the main contribution of this literature is to introduce measures of entrepreneurship capital 
in production functions that have been extensively estimated in other contexts (see Syverson 2011 
for a further methodological discussion). Therefore, we propose the estimation of a Cobb-Douglas 
(1928) function where establishment j’s output (Yj,i) is obtained as a combination of the inputs 
purchased by the establishment and other public inputs of the region i where it is placed: 
 
ln𝑌𝑗,𝑖 = 𝛽ln𝐿𝑗,𝑖 + 𝛼ln𝐾𝑗,𝑖 +  ln𝐼𝑗,𝑖 + 𝜌 ln𝑍𝑗,𝑖 + 𝜇ln𝑅𝑖 + 𝛿ln𝐸𝑖 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑖  (1) 
 
Then, the inputs considered at the establishment level are labour (Lj,i), (physical) capital (Kj,i), 
intermediate goods (Ij,i), and private knowledge (Zj,i), while inputs at the regional level are 
regional knowledge (Ri), regional entrepreneurship capital (Ei), and 𝜀𝑗,𝑖, which captures the usual 
error term. The parameters to be estimated are the production elasticities with respect to labour 
(β), capital (), intermediate goods (ϕ), private knowledge (ρ), public regional knowledge (μ) and 
regional entrepreneurship capital (δ) or entrepreneurship capital spillovers, which in previous 
studies have usually been positive and statistically significant. The existence of such positive 
spillovers has been interpreted as a call to arms (Acs et al. 2016) for the development of public 
policies to promote entrepreneurship. However, less consensus exists on how those policies 
should be developed.  
 
Acs et al. (2008) emphasize that entrepreneurship is a local phenomenon. Policies developed by 
local authorities can enhance the probability that clusters of entrepreneurs favouring the economic 
development of the zone appear. Those entrepreneurs can help each other and stimulate the 
economic growth of the place (Feldman, 2014). In accordance with the KSTE, entrepreneurship 
  
 
 
 
 
–  5  – 
 
 
facilitates the dissemination of knowledge among entrepreneurs. Therefore, public policies 
enhancing the generation of knowledge, the attractiveness of the place and the communication 
infrastructures can aid this purpose (Acs et al. 2016). In this sense, it has been argued that big 
cities have better conditions than more rural areas for the generation of such entrepreneurial 
clusters (Acs, et al. 2011). Furthermore, there is some evidence that entrepreneurship capital 
spillovers are higher in more urban regions (Audretsch and Keilbach 2005). Although some 
empirical evidence exists about the determinants of the level of entrepreneurial activity at the city 
level (Audretsch and Belitski 2017; Bosma and Sternberg 2014; Barreneche 2014), there is no 
evidence on the entrepreneurship capital spillovers at the city or similar local levels, which is the 
main justification for such policies. We can provide such evidence for the case of Ecuadorian 
cantons by controlling for provincial dummy variables. Therefore, those spillovers are beyond 
those produced by other provincial inputs, thus justifying the intervention of local governments. 
 
Hypothesis 1:  The production is higher in establishments placed in cantons with more 
entrepreneurship capital than other cantons of the same province. 
 
A second important issue for the development of public policies is whether they are more efficient 
when they foster specific kinds of entrepreneurs. For that purpose, some previous studies 
(Audretsch and Keilbach 2004a, b, c, 2008) sought to identify the type of entrepreneurship capital 
that generates more spillover effects. For example, Audretsch and Keilbach (2004a, b, c, 2008) 
classified entrepreneurship capital on the basis of the technological intensity of the sectors (high 
technology, ICTs, and other sectors). The theoretical argument behind this classification is that 
the newness of the knowledge used in these sectors is different. Therefore, in accordance with the 
KSTE, one would expect higher spillovers in regions with a higher relative presence of 
technological entrepreneurs. The evidence is mixed. Higher relative weights of technological 
sectors generated more spillover effects in Audretsch and Keilbach (2004c), while they generated 
less spillover effects in Audretsch and Keilbach (2004a, b, c, 2008).  
 
Acs et al. (2008) highlight legal infrastructure as an important part of the public policies for 
promoting entrepreneurship. In their words, “State and local regulations can also affect 
entrepreneurship, as they do for other businesses activities. For decades, economists have argued 
that many forms of regulation help large businesses that can pay the fixed costs of meeting those 
regulations, but harm smaller firms. (...) States and localities also may wish to consider exempting 
smaller businesses from certain regulation” (p.20). The informal economy is the usual term for 
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identifying businesses exempted from government taxes and regulation. The data available allow 
us to distinguish between formal and informal entrepreneurship capital. Although several theories 
have been proposed for explaining the transition from informal to formal businesses (see, for 
example, Bennett 2010), the empirical evidence (La Porta and Shleifer 2008; Bruhn 2011, 2013) 
suggests that there is not much mobility between informal and formal businesses. The informal 
economy is mainly composed of entrepreneurs with very low human capital that engage in small 
businesses with low value added and are in the less innovative sectors (La Porta and Shleifer 
2008). Therefore, one would expect less knowledge spillovers from informal establishments. 
 
From the discussion above, we propose to test whether the entrepreneurship capital spillovers are 
higher in those cantons with a higher weight of technological establishments and a lower weight 
of informal ones.    
 
Hypothesis 2:   The effect of regional entrepreneurship capital is a) higher when it is 
accumulated in technological sectors and b) lower when it is accumulated in 
informal establishments. 
 
A third important issue related to public policies is who provides the financial support. Some 
taxpayers can support the government policies without benefitting from the spillovers. Therefore, 
it is interesting to identify whether some sort of established business receives systematically 
higher entrepreneurship capital spillovers. Theoretical arguments justifying such spillover 
differences can be built based on the KSTE and the absorptive capacity theory. From the KSTE 
perspective, entrepreneurship is a facilitator of knowledge dissemination. From the absorptive 
capacity theory, established businesses have different levels of knowledge and capacity to 
accumulate further knowledge or absorptive capacities. Therefore, entrepreneurship capital 
spillover effects are expected to be higher in those establishments with lower current levels of 
knowledge and/or higher absorptive capacities. From Cohen and Levinthal (1990), several 
authors have related the technological intensity of the firms with their absorptive capacities. 
Tentatively, we postulate that large establishments have more resources and can learn faster, while 
the establishments of the same size that remain informal have accumulated lower levels of 
knowledge and thus have more to learn. Data at the establishment level allow us to estimate the 
elasticities of production with respect to entrepreneurship capital for each different group of 
establishments. The next hypothesis summarizes the expected results: 
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Hypothesis 3:  The benefits from entrepreneurship capital spillover effects (a) increase with the 
size of the establishment, (b) increase with its technological intensity, and (c) and 
increase with the level of informality.  
 
Finnaly, Audretsch and Keilbach (2004a, c, 2008) suggest that the entrepreneurship capital may 
be correlated with the production function error term in Equation (1). Therefore, the estimation 
of the entrepreneurship capital spillovers can suffer from an endogeneity problem. This seems 
quite reasonable when it is estimated with aggregated data. Those regions with higher production 
can also be the ones producing more entrepreneurs. Data at the establishment level seems to 
alleviate these problems. Nonetheless, we provide simultaneous estimations of the determinants 
of the establishments’ production, Equation (1), and the determinants of the cities’ entrepreneurial 
capital, Equation (2):  
 
ln𝐸𝑖 = ∑ 𝜃𝑥𝑋𝑥𝑥 + 𝑒𝑖         (2) 
 
where 𝑒𝑖 are the usual error terms and 𝜃𝑥 are the parameters to be estimated. As much as possible, 
we consider x similar determinants 𝑋𝑥 than the ones highlighted by the previous literature that 
analysed the determinants of the cities’ entrepreneurial capital. Consistent with previous findings, 
we expect positive relationships between the city’s entrepreneurship capital, the city’s 
agglomeration and its public resources. Using different measures related with the population 
density of the cities, Acs et al (2011), Bosma and Sternberg (2014) and Barreneche (2014) find 
evidence of a positive relationship between a city’s agglomeration and its entrepreneurship 
capital. Acs et al. (2011) and Audretsch and Belitski (2017) highlighted and provided evidence 
of the importance of a city’s amenities and infrastructures for stimulating the entrepreneurship 
capital of the city. Finally, we also include variables related to the economic situation in the city, 
namely, its GDP per capita. In accordance with Audretsch and Belitski (2017), previous literature 
has made ambiguous predictions about the relationship between the variables related to the 
economic situation and the cities’ entrepreneurship capital. All the determinants of the 
entrepreneurship capital of a city are going to be lagged one year. 
 
 
3. Data 
 
We use data from the Censo Nacional Económico3 (CENEC). This is a census of the 
                                                 
3 For further details about the census, see [http://www.ecuadorencifras.gob.ec/censo-nacional-economico]. 
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establishments in all 224 cantons of Ecuador from between September and November of 2010. 
The objective was to identify and collect information about all (visible) establishments where 
economic activity is conducted out and is physically separated from a home. Therefore, the census 
includes formal and informal establishments. Due to that, it is not based on the fulfilment of any 
regulations or tax payments. For this study, we excluded public and government establishments 
(10.310) and mining and oil extraction establishments (87). The census does not include those 
establishments that have a head office in the same canton. However, we have identified and 
omitted some establishments in which this is the case (55.278). We ended up with 445.490 
establishments.   
 
We identify the canton (i) and province where the establishments are placed, and therefore 
introduce fixed effects for provinces and cantons. Due to the lack of establishments, two cantons 
were omitted (El Piedrero y Las Golondrinas), leaving 222 cantons in the sample (see Table 1 for 
further details).  
 
We use the following information regarding each establishment. 
 
The establishment’s annual production (Output, Yj,i) measured by sales volume, the number of 
employees engaged in production activities (Labour, Lj,i), the fixed assets of the establishment 
(Capital, Kj,i), the current assets of the establishment (Intermediate Goods, Ij,i) and the investment 
in R&D activities and training (establishment’s Knowledge, Zj,i). All the monetary variables are 
in US dollars, the currency in Ecuador in 2010. 
 
The CENEC provides information about the economic activities of the establishments (two-digit 
NACE codes). Following the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
and EUROSTAT4, we identify a set of NACE two-digit sectors as technological businesses. See 
Table 2 for further details. The dummy variable DTech j,i takes a value of 1 when the establishment 
belongs to a technological sector. 
 
The CENEC also indicates whether the establishment is included in the Registro Único de 
Contribuyentes5 (in other words, whether or not it pays taxes). In fact, the Ecuadorian 
                                                 
4 Further details and references can be found in [https://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/48350231.pdf]. 
5 For further details, see the Servicio de Rentas Internas [http://www.ecuadorencifras.gob.ec/institucional/home].  
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governmental statistical office6 (INEC) considers an establishment as an informal one when it is 
not included in the Registro Único de Contribuyentes and has fewer than 100 workers. Using 
these criteria, we classify each establishment as either formal or informal. The dummy variable 
DInformal j,i takes a value of 1 when the establishment belongs to the informal economy. 
 
For each canton (i = 1,…, 222), we have collected the following information. 
 
The cantons’ knowledge is measured by the investments in R&D activities and training. We 
differentiate among the Regional Public Knowledge (accumulated by public and government 
establishments7, 𝑅𝑃𝑈𝐵𝑖) from the Regional Private Knowledge (accumulated by the rest of 
establishments, 𝑅𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉𝑖). Following Acs et al. (2012), entrepreneurship capital is measured by the 
ratio between the number of establishments and the canton’s population8, 𝐸𝑖 = 𝑛𝑖/𝑃𝑖. Graph 2 
shows its distribution among the different cantons. The measurement of entrepreneurship capital 
is open to discussion (Erikson 2002; Audretsch and Keilbach 2004a; Bönte et al. 2008). Several 
authors use start-ups instead of the stock of establishments. In Appendix 2, we reproduce the main 
analyses using the average of the last three years of the start-ups per inhabitant ratio in each canton 
following the method established in Audretsch and Keilbach (2004a, b, 2008). The main 
conclusions do not depend on the measure of entrepreneurship capital used. In each canton, we 
can compute the number of establishments in technological sectors, Knowledge-based 
Entrepreneurship Capital (𝐾𝐸𝑖), and its relative importance over the regional entrepreneurship 
capital (𝐾𝐸𝑖/𝐸𝑖). In a similar way, we can compute the number of establishments in the informal 
economy, informal entrepreneurship capital (𝐼𝐸𝑖), and its relative importance (𝐼𝐸𝑖/𝐸𝑖).  
 
Regarding the determinants of entrepreneurship capital, the cantons’ agglomeration (DENi,t-1) is 
measured by its population density, which is the number of inhabitants per square kilometre. As 
a proxy of the cantons’ public resources (TAXi,t-1), we have collected information about the ratio 
of total taxes paid by the establishments over the GDP (in thousands of dollars). Related to the 
economic situation of the canton, we have collected information about the GDP (in thousands of 
dollars) per capita for each region (𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1). We collected this information from the INEC. These 
                                                 
6 More concretely, the Instituto Ecuatoriano de Estadísticas y Censos. For further details, see 
 [http://www.ecuadorencifras.gob.ec/institucional/home].  
7 We use information related to the 10.310 establishments not included in the sample. 
8 The cantons’ poulation is obtained from the Censo de Población y Vivienda (CPV) 
[http://www.ecuadorencifras.gob.ec/censo-de-poblacion-y-vivienda, 2010]. 
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variables have been included in the logarithms and are one period lagged. Therefore, they refer to 
2009. 
 
The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 3. The correlations between variables are in Table 
4.  
 
4. Results 
 
Table 5 shows different estimations of Equation (1). The differences between the columns or 
models are the additional variables included. In the best case, the increase in the explanatory 
power of the model R2 is 0.0236. As an indicator of the collinearity magnitude, we use the variance 
inflator factor (VIF). In all cases, the values are below 10, which is the usual maximum acceptable 
level. 
 
Model 1 is the basic model. Much of the coefficients are output elasticities that indicate the 
percentage change of the production associated with a 1% increase in the input amount. The 
elasticity of production with respect to labour () is 0.7376, the elasticity with respect to capital 
(α) is 0.1656, the elasticity with respect to current capital (ϕ) is 0.2190, the elasticity of production 
with respect to private knowledge (ρ) is 0.0587. All of these coefficients are statistically 
significant at the 1% level. The values of those elasticities are quite stable among the different 
Models, except when interactions are included, see Model 4. Model 1 also includes Provincial 
fixed effects (i.e., we control for all the public inputs at the province level). The inclusion of these 
24 dummies is associated with an R2 increase of 0.0054. 
 
Model 2 is estimated for testing Hypotheses 1 and 2. In this case, we present a three-stage 
simultaneous estimation of Equations (1) and (2). Regarding Equation (1), we add the basic 
variables related to the KTSE theory, the regional knowledge, the entrepreneurship capital and its 
composition. The coefficient associated with the regional entrepreneurship capital is 0.1937, 
which is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, which supports Hypothesis 1. There 
are entrepreneurship capital spillovers at the cantonal level after controlling for the public inputs 
at the provincial level. We also find that the elasticity of production with respect to the cities’ 
knowledge generated by public institutions is 0.0017, while knowledge generated by private 
institutions is 0.0026; both elasticities are positive and statistically significant at the usual levels. 
With respect to Hypothesis 2, we find that the establishments in cantons with higher weights of 
informal and technological establishments have lower production. The estimated elasticities are 
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respectively -0.0549 and -0.0261, and only the first one is statistically significant. Therefore, we 
only find support for Hypothesis 2b; informal businesses generate fewer spillovers. 
 
Regarding the determinants of entrepreneurship capital, we find that all the estimated elasticities 
in Equation (2) are positive and statistically significant. Therefore, ceteris paribus, those cantons 
that are wealthier, have denser populations and have higher tax pressures have higher levels of 
entrepreneurship capital.  
 
Model 3 includes in Equation (1) cantons’ fixed effects. This implies an increase of 0.0036 in the 
R2, which can be interpreted as the importance of the omitted cantonal inputs. For testing 
Hypothesis 3, we add interaction terms between the entrepreneurship capital and the 
establishments’ size, its technological intensity, and its formalization level. The results are 
presented in Model 4. The elasticity of production with respect to the entrepreneurship capital is 
0.1282 and 0.0814 points higher in technological and formal establishments than in non-
technological and informal ones, respectively. Take note that in this specification, the elasticity 
of production with respect to labour depends on the entrepreneurship capital of the canton. For 
example, when this is evaluated at the average value of the entrepreneurship capital (-3.4060), the 
elasticity is 0.7080, being 0.8257 when there is an increase of one standard deviation (0.3515) in 
the entrepreneurship capital. All the coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level. These 
results support Hypothesis 3; larger, more technological and more informal establishments benefit 
more from the spillover effects of regional entrepreneurship capital. Furthermore, ceteris paribus, 
low technological and informal establishments have on average 25.84% and 20.81% less 
production than technological and formal establishments, respectively. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This paper provides evidence related to the local existence of entrepreneurship capital spillovers 
and the characteristics of entrepreneurs that generate and benefit more from those spillovers. 
These are important issues for the design and development of public policies to promote 
entrepreneurship. 
 
Data about the entrepreneurship capital of 222 Ecuadorian cantons show that the spillovers are a 
local phenomenon. The evidence seems consistent with the KSTE arguments. Personal contacts 
between the staffs of different firms help to disseminate knowledge and those contacts are mostly 
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produced at the local level. Therefore, important spillovers are produced at the local level. Our 
evidence confirms this, but we need further evidence to extend the results to other geographic 
areas and for a better understanding of their determinants. Meanwhile, the evidence provided in 
this study suggests that the development and implementation of public policies to promote 
entrepreneurship is in part a responsibility of the local authorities. 
A second piece of evidence is related to the kind of establishments that generate more spillovers. 
The evidence comes from a Latin American country, an institutional environment scarcely 
analysed until now, in which the informal economy plays an important role. It has been argued 
(Acs et al. 2008) that the laxity in business regulation is a political decision. Therefore, it is 
important to know its implications. The evidence shows that in those cantons with higher weights 
of informal establishments, the entrepreneurship capital spillovers are lower. The kind of 
businesses developed by the informal economy seem to be those that generate lower spillovers. 
Further evidence is needed to confirm those results in other contexts. Furthermore, we also test 
whether the relative importance of technological firms in a canton increases or decreases the 
entrepreneurship capital spillovers. Although we found a negative effect, it is not statistically 
significant. Therefore, the debate about the importance of technological firms as a higher source 
of spillovers remains open. 
       
Finally, the use of data at the establishment also provided a third piece of evidence related to the 
type of firms that benefited the most from the entrepreneurship capital spillover effects. From our 
analyses, we detect that technological, large and informal establishments receive the most benefits 
from such spillover effects. The evidence can be interpreted to mean that technological and large 
firms have, on average, higher absorptive capacities (Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Qian and Acs 
2013), while informal firms have more to learn. Further studies using data at the establishment 
level are needed to confirm such relationships and identify whether some type of firms 
systematically benefit from entrepreneurship capital spillovers. 
 
This research has limitations. This study uses cross-sectional data, which makes it difficult to 
address endogeneity and causality problems. The data come from a specific country and 
institutional setting, so we cannot guarantee its generality. The data do not allow for the 
determination of how these spillover effects are produced and consequently the sources of such 
spillover effects. Further evidence could help to overcome these limitations. 
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Table 1.       The Ecuadorian administrative organization   
 
Province Cantons Inhabitants    km2  Province Cantons Inhabitants km2 
Azuay Cuenca 505.585  3.191   Esmeraldas San Lorenzo 42.486  3.051  
Azuay Girón 12.607  354   Esmeraldas Atacames 41.526  509  
Azuay Gualaceo 42.709  350   Esmeraldas Rioverde 26.869  1.508  
Azuay Nabon 15.892  633   Esmeraldas La Concordia 42.924  323  
Azuay Paute 25.494  271   Guayas Guayaquil 2.350.915  4.196  
Azuay Pucara 10.052  585   Guayas Alfredo Baquerizo Moreno 
(Jujan) 
25.179  219  
Azuay San Fernando 3.993  139   Guayas Bal o 20.523  410  
Azuay Santa Isabel 18.393  605   Guayas Balzar 53.937  1.186  
Azuay Sigsig 26.910  659   Guayas Colimes 23.423  758  
Azuay Oña 3.583  293   Guayas Daule 120.326  462  
Azuay Chordeleg 12.577  105   Guayas Durán 235.769  300  
Azuay El Pan 3.036  132   Guayas El Empalme 74.451  716  
Azuay Sevilla De Oro 5.889  315   Guayas El Triunfo 44.778  395  
Azuay Guachapala 3.409  40   Guayas Milagro 166.634  405  
Azuay Camilo Ponce Enríquez 21.998  639   Guayas Naranjal 69.012  1.740  
Bolivar Guaranda 91.877  1.892   Guayas Naranjito 37.186  225  
Bolivar Chillanes 17.406  663   Guayas Palestina 16.065  194  
Bolivar Chimbo 15.779  261   Guayas Pedro Carbo 43.436  935  
Bolivar Echeandia 12.114  230   Guayas Samborondón 67.590  368  
Bolivar San Miguel 27.244  574   Guayas Santa Lucía 38.923  358  
Bolivar Caluma 13.129  177   Guayas Salitre (Urbina Jado) 57.402  393  
Bolivar Las Naves 6.092  149   Guayas San Jacinto De Yaguachi 60.958  510  
Cañar Azogues 70.064  611   Guayas Playas 41.935  273  
Cañar Biblian 20.817  227   Guayas Simón Bolívar 25.483  292  
Cañar Cañar 59.323  1.798   Guayas Marcelino Maridueña 12.033  254  
Cañar La Troncal 54.389  320   Guayas Lomas De Sargentillo 18.413  67  
Cañar El Tambo 9.475  64   Guayas Nobol 19.600  135  
Cañar Deleg 6.100  76   Guayas General Antonio Elizalde 
(Bucay) 
10.642  154  
Cañar Suscal 5.016  50   Guayas Isidro Ayora 10.870  487  
Carchi Tulcán 86.498  1.828   Imbabura Ibarra 181.175  1.093  
Carchi Bolívar 14.347  359   Imbabura Antonio Ante 43.518  82  
Carchi Espejo 13.364  554   Imbabura Cotacachi 40.036  1.687  
Carchi Mira 12.180  587   Imbabura Otavalo 104.874  490  
Carchi Montufar 30.511  383   Imbabura Pimampiro 12.970  449  
Carchi San Pedro De Huaca 7.624  69   Imbabura San Miguel De Urcuqui 15.671  785  
Cotopaxi Latacunga 170.489  1.386   Loja Loja 214.855  1.895  
Cotopaxi La Mana 42.216  656   Loja Calvas 28.185  841  
Cotopaxi Pangua 21.965  722   Loja Catamayo 30.638  652  
Cotopaxi Pujilí 69.055  1.302   Loja Celica 14.468  521  
Cotopaxi Salcedo 58.216  486   Loja Chaguarpamba 7.161  313  
Cotopaxi Saquisilí 25.320  205   Loja Espindola 14.799  516  
Cotopaxi Sigchos 21.944  1.352   Loja Gonzanama 12.716  698  
Chimborazo Riobamba 225.741  983   Loja Macará 19.018  576  
Chimborazo Alausí 44.089  1.657   Loja Paltas 23.801  1.155  
Chimborazo Colta 44.971  836   Loja Puyango 15.513  638  
Chimborazo Chambo 11.885  164   Loja Saraguro 30.183  1.083  
Chimborazo Chunchi 12.686  273   Loja Sozoranga 7.465  411  
Chimborazo Guamote 45.153  1.222   Loja Zapotillo 12.312  1.213  
Chimborazo Guano 42.851  460   Loja Pindal 8.645  202  
Chimborazo Pallatanga 11.544  379   Loja Quilanga 4.337  237  
Chimborazo Penipe 6.739  367   Loja Olmedo 4.870  113  
Chimborazo Cumandá 12.922  159   Los Ríos Babahoyo 153.776  1.087  
El Oro Machala 245.972  330   Los Ríos Baba 39.681  517  
El Oro Arenillas 26.844  808   Los Ríos Montalvo 24.164  363  
El Oro Atahualpa 5.833  278   Los Ríos Puebloviejo 36.477  336  
El Oro Balsas 6.861  70   Los Ríos Quevedo 173.575  305  
El Oro Chilla 2.484  332   Los Ríos Urdaneta 29.263  378  
El Oro El Guabo 50.009  607   Los Ríos Ventanas 66.551  815  
El Oro Huaquillas 48.285  64   Los Ríos Vinces 71.736  697  
El Oro Marcabeli 5.450  149   Los Ríos Palenque 22.320  580  
El Oro Pasaje 72.806  456   Los Ríos Buena Fe 63.148  581  
El Oro Piñas 25.988  617   Los Ríos Valencia 42.556  978  
El Oro Portovelo 12.200  288   Los Ríos Mocache 38.392  568  
El Oro Santa Rosa 69.036  822   Los Ríos Quinsaloma 16.476  280  
El Oro Zaruma 24.097  649   Manabí Portoviejo 280.029  961  
El Oro Las Lajas 4.794  298   Manabí Bolívar 40.735  538  
Esmeraldas Esmeraldas 189.504  1.350   Manabí Chone 126.491  3.037  
Esmeraldas Eloy Alfaro 39.739  4.273   Manabí El Carmen 89.021  1.261  
Esmeraldas Muisne 28.474  1.243   Manabí Flavio Alfaro 25.004  1.347  
Esmeraldas Quinindé 122.570  3.875   Manabí Jipijapa 71.083  1.467  
         
         
  
 
 
 
 
–  17  – 
 
 
         
Manabí Junín 18.942  246   Pichincha Rumiñahui 85.852  136  
Manabí Manta 226.477  303   Pichincha San Miguel De Los Bancos 17.573  850  
Manabí Montecristi 70.294  739   Pichincha Pedro Vicente Maldonado 12.924  624  
Manabí Pajan 37.073  1.088   Pichincha Puerto Quito 20.445  695  
Manabí Pichincha 30.244  1.075   Tungurahua Ambato 329.856  1.018  
Manabí Rocafuerte 33.469  280   Tungurahua Baños De Agua Santa 20.018  1.066  
Manabí Santa Ana 47.385  1.025   Tungurahua Cevallos 8.163  19  
Manabí Sucre 57.159  694   Tungurahua Mocha 6.777  86  
Manabí Tosagua 38.341  375   Tungurahua Patate 13.497  316  
Manabí 24 De Mayo 28.846  526   Tungurahua Quero 19.205  174  
Manabí Pedernales 55.128  1.907   Tungurahua San Pedro De Pelileo 56.573  202  
Manabí Olmedo 9.844  254   Tungurahua Santiago De Pillaro 38.357  447  
Manabí Puerto López 20.451  429   Tungurahua Tisaleo 12.137  59  
Manabí Jama 23.253  579   Zamora 
Chinchipe 
Zamora 25.510  1.898  
Manabí Jaramijó 18.486  97   Zamora 
Chinchipe 
Chinchipe 9.119  1.156  
Manabí San Vicente 22.025  709   Zamora 
Chinchipe 
Nangaritza 5.196  2.023  
Morona Santiago Morona 41.155  4.657   Zamora 
Chinchipe 
Yacuambi 5.835  1.254  
Morona Santiago Gualaquiza 17.162  2.208   Zamora 
Chinchipe 
Yantzaza 18.675  1.014  
Morona Santiago Limón Indanza 9.722  1.821   Zamora 
Chinchipe 
El Pangui 8.619  631  
Morona Santiago Palora 6.936  1.455   Zamora 
Chinchipe 
Centinela Del Condor 6.479  262  
Morona Santiago Santiago 9.295  1.405   Zamora 
Chinchipe 
Palanda 8.089  1.991  
Morona Santiago Sucua 18.318  893   Zamora 
Chinchipe 
Paquisha 3.854  354  
Morona Santiago Huamboya 8.466  664   Galápagos San Cristobal 7.475  849  
Morona Santiago San Juan Bosco 3.908  1.055   Galápagos Isabela 2.256  5.368  
Morona Santiago Taisha 18.437  6.170   Galápagos Santa Cruz 15.393  1.794  
Morona Santiago Logroño 5.723  1.171   Sucumbíos Lago Agrio 91.744  3.143  
Morona Santiago Pablo Sexto 1.823  1.390   Sucumbíos Gonzalo Pizarro 8.599  2.229  
Morona Santiago Tiwintza 6.995  1.170   Sucumbíos Putumayo 10.174  3.575  
Napo Tena 60.880  3.922   Sucumbíos Shushufindi 44.328  2.470  
Napo Archidona 24.969  3.029   Sucumbíos Sucumbios 3.390  1.511  
Napo El Chaco 7.960  3.500   Sucumbíos Cascales 11.104  1.250  
Napo Quijos 6.224  1.589   Sucumbíos Cuyabeno 7.133  3.906  
Napo Carlos Julio Arosemena 
Tola 
3.664  502   Orellana Orellana 72.795  7.079  
Pastaza Pastaza 62.016  19.930   Orellana Aguarico 4.847  11.260  
Pastaza Mera 11.861  528   Orellana La Joya De Los Sachas 37.591  1.202  
Pastaza Santa Clara 3.565  314   Orellana Loreto 21.163  2.151  
Pastaza Arajuno 6.491  8.869   Sto. Dom. de 
los Tsáchilas 
Santo Domingo 368.013  3.447  
Pichincha Quito 2.239.191  4.218   Santa Elen  Santa Elena 144.076  3.597  
Pichincha Cayambe 85.795  1.191   Santa Elena La Libertad 95.942  25  
Pichincha Mejia 81.335  1.485   Santa Elena Salinas 68.675  68  
Pichincha Pedro Moncayo 33.172  338   Manabí* Manga Del Cura 20.758  487  
     Imbabura** Las Golondrinas 6.329 127 
     Guayas** El Piedrero 5.302 170 
 
Source: National Institute of Statistics and Censuses, INEC, 2010. 
 (*) Manga del Cura was incorporated in 2017 into the province of Manabí. Originally it was not assigned to a concrete province. In the analyses, it is 
considered as a canton of Manabí.  
(**) In the case of Las Golondrinas and El Piedrero, there is no information about establishments. Therefore, they are excluded from the analyses. 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
–  18  – 
 
 
Table 2.     Technological sectors. 
 
  
NACE Code Sector description 
  
  
J58 Publishing activities 
J59 Motion picture, video and television programme production, sound recording and music publishing activities 
J60 Programming and broadcasting activities 
J61 Telecommunications 
J62 Computer programming, consultancy and related activities 
J63 Information service activities 
M69 Legal and accounting activities 
M70 Activities of head offices; Management consultancy activities 
M71 Architectural and engineering activities; technical testing and analyses 
M72 Scientific research and development 
M73 Advertising and market research 
M74 Other professional, scientific and technical activities 
P85 Education  
R91 Libraries, archives, museums and other cultural activities 
  
 
 
Source: National Institute of Statistics and Censuses, INEC, 2010. 
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Table 3.     Descriptive statistics 
  
Establishments 
   
Mean Standard  
Deviation 
     
lnYj,i   9.2404  1.6141  
lnIj,i   5,6803  2,4177  
lnKj,i   7.3621  1.8953  
lnLj,i   0.4981  0.6668  
lnZj,i   0.0255  0.4556  
lnRPUBj,i   13.1216  5.2355  
lnRPRIVj,i   11.0444  6.2526  
lnE j,i   -3.4060  0.3515  
ln(IEj,i /Ej,i)   -1.1005 0.3283  
ln(KEj,i /Ej,i)   -2.5117 0.2295  
DInform j,i   0.3496  0.4769  
DTech j,i   0.0831  0.2760  
lnyj,i,t-1   1.3314  0.4677  
lnDEN j,i,t-1   5.3861  1.2129  
lnTAX j,i,t-1   2.6093  1.3963  
     
     
Observations: 445.490 
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Table 4.     Correlation Matrix  
 
 
               
      
    
 lnYj,i  lnKj,i  lnIj,i  lnLj,i  lnZj,i  lnRpubj,i  lnRprivj,i  lnEj,i  ln(IEj,i/Ej,i)  ln(KEi/Ei)  lnyj,i,t-1  DEN j,i,t-1  
                         
                         
lnKj,i 0.4067 ***                       
 [0.000]                        
lnIj,i 0.4275 *** 0.2325 ***                     
 [0.000]  [0.000]                      
lnLj.i 0.4484 *** 0.4291 *** 0.1677 ***                   
 [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]                    
lnZj.i 0.0803 *** 0.0889 *** 0.0300 *** 0.1183 ***                 
 
[0.000]  [0.000]   [0.000]   [0.000]                       
lnRpubj.i 0.0749 *** 0.0565 *** 0.0315 *** 0.0516 *** 0.0210                
 [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]                
lnRprivj.i 0.0934 *** 0.0702 *** 0.0267 *** 0.0665 *** 0.0240 *** 0.7423 ***             
 [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]              
lnEi.i 0.0414 *** 0.0361 *** 0.0263 *** 0.0054 *** 0.0143 *** 0.4415 *** 0.5171 ***           
 [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]            
ln(IEj.i/Ej.i) -0.0068 *** -0.0537 *** -0.0379 *** 0.0361 *** -0.0174 *** -0.2454 *** -0.1355 *** -0.4541 ***         
 [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]          
ln(Kj.i/Ej.i) 0.0402 *** 0.0586 *** 0.0292 *** 0.0021  0.0265 *** 0.5236 *** 0.6203 *** 0.4739 *** -0.4850 ***       
 [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.163]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]        
lnyj.i.t-1 0.1000 *** 0.0865 *** 0.0366 *** 0.0557 *** 0.0167 *** 0.5302 *** 0.6859 *** 0.4351 *** -0.2362 *** 0.3888 ***     
 [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]      
lnDEN j.i.t-1 0.0672  *** 0.0344  *** 0.0085  *** 0.0680  *** 0.0133  *** 0.4464  *** 0.7066  *** 0.3845  *** 0.2092  *** 0.3408  *** 0.4320  ***   
 [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]    
lnTAX j.i.t-1 0.0761  *** 0.0602  *** 0.0260  *** 0.0458  *** 0.0200  *** 0.6677  *** 0.7472  *** 0.6559  *** -0.2305  *** 0.5668  *** 0.4569  *** 0.6252  *** 
 [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  
                         
 
*: Significant at the 0.10 level. **: Significant at the 0.05 level. ***: Significant at the 0.01 level. p-values are in brackets. 
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Table 5.     Hypotheses Tests 
 
  
  
 
Equation [1] Dependent Variable: lnYj.i 
  
 Model   1  2  3  4  
Independent Coefficient           
Variable            
Constant     6.3644 *** 6.7851 *** 6.3857 *** 6.7959  *** 
      [0.016]   [0.095]   [0.016]   [0.017]   
lnKj.i α   0.1656 *** 0.1645 *** 0.1655 *** 0.1359  *** 
    [0.002]   [0.001]   [0.002]   [0.002]   
lnIj.i ϕ   0.2190 *** 0.2188 *** 0.2194 *** 0.1998  *** 
    [0.001]   [0.001]   [0.001]   [0.001]   
lnLj.i β   0.7376 *** 0.7352 *** 0.7339 *** 1.8471  *** 
    [0.005]   [0.003]   [0.005]   [0.051]   
lnZj.i ρ   0.0587 *** 0.0583 *** 0.0580 *** 0.0593  *** 
    [0.005]   [0.004]   [0.005]   [0.005]   
Province  Dummies   Yes  Yes  No  No  
lnRpubi μpub       0.0017 ***         
        [0.001]           
lnRprivi μpriv       0.0026 **         
        [0.001]           
lnEi δ       0.1937 ***         
         [0.017]           
ln(KEi /Ei) 𝛿KE       -0.0549 ***         
         [0.018]           
ln(IEi /Ei) 𝛿IE       -0.0261           
         [0.017]           
lnEi * lnLj 𝛿S               0.3344 *** 
                 [0.015]   
DTech j.i 𝑑T               0.2584 *** 
                 [0.084]   
lnEi * DTech j.i 𝛿T               0.1282 *** 
                 [0.025]   
DInform j.i 𝑑I               -0.2082 *** 
                 [0.049]   
lnEi * DInform j.i 𝛿I               0.0814 *** 
                [0.014]   
Canton                       Dummies       Yes   Yes   
R2     0.3653   0.3662   0.3698   0.3889   
Observations 445.490           
Independent 
Variable Coefficient Equation [2] Dependent Variable: lnEi 
Constant        -4.2159 ***       
         [0.002]         
lny j.i.t-1 𝜃1       0.2735 ***       
         [0.001]         
lnDEN j.i.t-1 𝜃2       0.1076 ***       
         [0.001]         
lnTAXj.i.t-1 𝜃3       0.0689 ***       
         [0.000]         
Province  Dummies     Yes      
R2      0.7477      
Observations 445.490                 
            
*: Significant at the 0.10 level. **: Significant at the 0.05 level. ***: Significant at the 0.01 level. Robust standard errors are in brackets.   
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Graph 1.      Map of Ecuadorian Provinces 
 
 
 
Source: National Institute of Statistics and Censuses. INEC. 2010. 
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Graph 2.      Entrepreneurship Capital Density 
 
 
 
 
         
                                                                                                                                            Low density                     High density 
Source: Own elaboration, using CENEC data.   
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Appendix 1.    Entrepreneurship capital measured by city start-ups. 
 
In the table below, the entrepreneurship capital is measured by the average of the last three 
year’s ratios between the start-ups per inhabitant of each city. 
 
 
Table A.1.        Hypothesis Test (Entrepreneurship Capital: Start-Ups).  
 
 
  
 
Equation [1] Dependent Variable: lnYj.i 
  
Model    1  2  3  4  
Independent Coefficient           
Variable            
Constant     6.3644 *** 7.1993 *** 6.3857 *** 6.8058  *** 
      [0.016]   [0.121]   [0.016]   [0.017]   
lnKj.i α   0.1656 *** 0.1645 *** 0.1655 *** 0.1359  *** 
    [0.002]   [0.001]   [0.002]   [0.002]   
lnIj.i ϕ   0.2190 *** 0.2188 *** 0.2194 *** 0.1998  *** 
    [0.001]   [0.001]   [0.001]   [0.001]   
lnLj.i β   0.7376 *** 0.7352 *** 0.7339 *** 2.6456  *** 
    [0.005]   [0.003]   [0.005]   [0.082]   
lnZj.i ρ   0.0587 *** 0.0583 *** 0.0580 *** 0.0583  *** 
    [0.005]   [0.004]   [0.005]   [0.005]   
Province  Dummies   Yes  Yes  No  No  
lnRpubi μpub       0.0019 ***         
        [0.001]           
lnRprivi μpriv       0.0027 ***         
        [0.001]           
lnEi δ       0.2032 ***         
         [0.017]           
ln(KEi /Ei) 𝛿KE       -0.0616 ***         
         [0.017]           
ln(IEi /Ei) 𝛿IE       -0.0304 *         
         [0.016]           
lnEi * lnLj 𝛿S               0.3608 *** 
                 [0.016]   
DTech j.i 𝑑T               0.6240 *** 
                 [0.136]   
lnEi * DTech j.i 𝛿T               0.1495 *** 
                 [0.026]   
DInform j.i 𝑑I               -0.1284 * 
                 [0.077]   
lnEi * DInform j.i 𝛿I               0.0666 *** 
                [0.014]   
Canton                      Dummies       Yes   Yes   
R2     0.3653   0.3660   0.3698   0.3892   
Observations 445.490           
 
*: Significant at the 0.10 level. **: Significant at the 0.05 level. ***: Significant at the 0.01 level. Robust standard errors are in brackets.   
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Table A.1.  (Cont.) Hypothesis Test (Entrepreneurship Capital: Start-Ups).  
 
 
 
 
 
Independent 
Variable Coefficient Equation [2] Dependent Variable: lnEj.i 
Constant        -6.1872 ***       
         [0.002]         
lny j.i.t-1 𝜃1       0.2377 ***       
         [0.001]         
lnDEN j.i.t-1 𝜃2       0.1198 ***       
         [0.001]         
lnTAXj.i.t-1 𝜃3       0.0534 ***       
         [0.000]         
Province  Dummies     Yes      
R2      0.7212      
Observations 445.490                 
            
*: Significant at the 0.10 level. **: Significant at the 0.05 level. ***: Significant at the 0.01 level. Robust standard errors are in brackets.    
 
 
